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Abstract 
Increasing automation in the automotive systems has re-focused the 
industry’s attention on verification and validation methods and 
especially on the development of test scenarios. The complex nature 
of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs) and Automated 
Driving (AD) systems warrant the adoption of new and innovative 
means of evaluating and establishing the safety of such systems. In 
this paper, the authors discuss the results from a semi-structured 
interview study, which involved interviewing ADAS and AD experts 
across the industry supply chain.  
Eighteen experts (each with over 10 years’ of experience in testing 
and development of automotive systems) from different countries 
were interviewed on two themes: test methods and test scenarios. 
Each of the themes had three guiding questions which had some 
follow-up questions. The interviews were transcribed and a thematic 
analysis via coding was conducted on the transcripts. A two-stage 
coding analysis process was done to first identify codes from the 
transcripts and subsequently, the codes were grouped into categories.  
The analysis of transcripts for the question about the biggest 
challenge in the area of test methods revealed two specific themes. 
Firstly, the definition of pass/fail criteria and secondly the quality of 
requirements (completeness and consistency). The analysis of the 
questions on test scenarios revealed that “good” scenario is one that 
is able to test a safety goal and ways in which a system may fail. 
Based on the analysis of the transcripts, the authors propose two 
types of testing for ADAS and AD systems: Requirements-Based 
Testing (traditional method) and Hazard Based Testing. The 
proposed approach not only generates test scenarios for testing how 
the system works, but also how the system may fail. 
Introduction 
The introduction of Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADASs) 
and Automated Driving (AD) systems in cars have many benefits 
ranging from increased safety [1,2], lower emissions, reduced traffic 
congestion [3,4] and more useful time for the driver [5]. The potential 
benefits of automated systems have led the push towards their 
commercialisation. Interestingly, the public opinion about 
“completely self-driving (fully automated) vehicles” has been shown 
to be in line with the proposed safety benefits [6]. Automated systems 
offer many benefits in other industries too where they have been 
introduced, e.g. aviation, nuclear, chemical process, railways etc. 
Unfortunately, the introduction of automation in these industries was 
coupled with many accidents, some of which have continued to 
repeat themselves [7]. Even within the automotive industry, many 
relatively advanced features (at the time), have caused vehicle re-
calls due to faulty software, costing millions of dollars to the 
manufacturers; e.g. to fix the ignition switch issue, General Motors 
spent approximately $400 million for the 2.6 million affected 
vehicles [8]. Fixing a bug during the development process costs an 
average of $25, while after release it increases to $16000 on an 
average [9]. A bug in a released product could be caused due to: 1) 
incorrect requirements 2) missing requirements 3) release of untested 
code, 4) testing sequence differs from use sequence 5) user applied 
untested input values 6) untested operating conditions [10]. The latter 
was illustrated in the Ariane 5 disaster [11], where software was 
reused from Ariane 4 software in the Ariane 5 system without enough 
testing [12]. This importance of operating environment and potential 
consequence of untested inputs was also seen in the recent Tesla 
“Auto-pilot” system crash [13]. It has been suggested that majority of 
the software related accidents are a result of the operation of the 
software rather than its lack of operation [14]. 
Therefore, in order to realize the benefits of automation or any other 
system, we need to ensure that the systems have a safe and a robust 
functionality. This may be achieved by testing and certification of the 
systems. However, lack of standardized test methods and test 
scenarios; and the lack of international standards to define safety 
requirements for automated systems, have led to a subjective 
interpretation of “safety”, particularly for ADAS and AD systems in 
vehicles. While the ISO 26262 standard [15], provides some 
guidance for testing methods and approaches for a product 
development cycle, it too falls short to deal with the complexities of 
ADAS and AD systems. Furthermore, even with ISO 26262 – 2011 
been increasingly adopted in the industry, there is still a lack of a 
“quantified and rigorous process for automotive certification” [16]. 
This is caused due to the lack of objective quantification of severity, 
exposure and controllability ratings which comprise the ASIL rating, 
causing inter- and intra-rater variations [16,17]. 
Current luxury cars are a complex system with over 100 millions 
lines of code as compared to 7 million in a Boeing 747 airplane [18]. 
The introduction of ADASs and AD systems is going to further 
increase the complexity many fold with multiple interactions between 
subsystems. Additionally, ADASs and AD systems offer a new 
challenge for testing and safety analysis [19]. While a variety of 
ADASs and AD systems exist or are in development, each of them 
offers a different kind of a challenge for testing. The move towards 
higher levels of automation is coupled with the challenge of testing 
and safety analysis as it needs complex solutions to include 
interactions between a larger number of variables and the 
environment. It is suggested that in order to prove that automated 
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vehicles are safer than human drivers, they will need to be driven for 
more than 11 billion miles [20]. Even after 11 billion miles, such 
testing will “only assure safety but not always ensure it” [21], thus 
suggesting vehicle level testing or real world testing before start of 
production (SOP) wouldn’t be enough to prove safety of the 
automated driving systems [22,23]. While software testing has been 
said to be the “least understood part of the (system) development 
process” [10], the authors believe that a scientific approach needs to 
be adopted to solve the challenge of identifying scenarios that capture 
the complex interactions within systems and system-environment in 
an efficient manner. 
Understanding Scenarios 
These complex interactions can be captured as use cases which 
“describe the system behaviour as a sequence of actions linking the 
result to a particular actor” (e.g. driver). Subsequently, scenarios (a 
specific sequence of a use case) present possible ways in which a 
system may be used to accomplish a desired function. However, 
writing scenarios require detailed domain knowledge, which is only 
found with experts. Moreover, the term “use cases” and “scenarios” 
have been used with a fuzzy meaning [24,25]. A use case is a 
collection of scenarios bound together by a common goal [25] and 
implies “the way in which a user uses a system” [26]. Scenarios have 
been suggested to have at least four different meanings: 1) scenarios 
to illustrate the system 2) scenarios for evaluation 3) scenarios for 
design 4) scenarios to test theories [24]. It is worth elucidating that a 
scenario that is good for illustrating a system demo (i.e. 
demonstration) may not be good for evaluating the basic functions 
(i.e. requirement based testing), as the former only uses a limited 
number of examples. Similarly, scenarios to test theories establish the 
strengths and more importantly the weaknesses of a design. 
Therefore, they go beyond the traditional requirement based testing.  
Existing Requirements Based Testing (RBT) approach widely used in 
the industry, only ensures that the system meets its requirements 
while failing to identify the exceptions explicitly. Some exceptions 
may be covered sporadically due to the experience of historic failures 
rather than a scientific approach. Additionally, RBT is not able to 
ensure completeness of requirements. Requirements reflect the 
expert’s view of system’s functionality and possible usage. The 
identification of the requirements has a degree of subjectivity 
associated with it [27]. Different experts with different background 
knowledge analyse and classify systems differently, leading to an 
inter-rater variation in understanding requirements [17,28]. 
This is evident in the variation in the classification and identification 
of scenarios like the “Black Swan” scenarios or the “unknown 
unknowns” (scenarios that we don’t know that we don’t know) 
associated with the functionality of the system [29]. While 
requirements based testing captures the “known knowns” efficiently, 
the inability to ensure its completeness leads to the occurrence of 
“unknown knowns”, “known unknowns” and the Black Swan 
scenarios. In addition, to avoid the variation in understanding of the 
terms use-cases, scenarios and test cases, the authors adopt the 
definition as described in [30]. 
Types of testing 
The international standard ISO 26262 [15] is the automotive industry 
best practice standard for functional safety. ISO 26262 Part 4 and 
Part 6 provide guidance on different methods for testing and for 
deriving test cases for software integration testing and software unit 
testing respectively. ISO 26262 – 2011 Part 4 and Part 6 recommend 
the use of test methods like requirement based test, fault-injection test 
and back-to-back comparison test (Figure 1). For each of the test 
methods, the standard recommends methods like analysis of 
requirements, analysis of equivalence classes, analysis of boundary 
values and error guessing as methods for deriving test cases (Figure 
2).  
Figure 1. Methods for testing functional safety and technical requirements as 
per ISO 26262 – 2011 Part 4 
Figure 2. Methods for deriving test cases for software unit testing as per ISO 
26262 – 2011 Part 6 
Figure 3. Software architecture level structural coverage metrics per ISO 
26262 – 2011 Part 6 
Figure 4. Software unit structural coverage metrics as per ISO 26262 – 2011 
Part 6 
The ISO 26262 standard also recommends some metrics to measure 
the completeness of the testing process. These include coverage 
metrics like function coverage and call coverage at the integration 
level (Figure 3) and branch coverage, statement coverage and 
MC/DC (Modified Condition/Decision Coverage) at unit level 
(Figure 4). 
As suggested by ISO 26262 – 2011, testers tend to go all-out for 
coverage metrics. While this is “a metric”, it needs to be highlighted 
that it should be treated as the minimum metric. If achieving high 
coverage was the golden bullet for testing, then products in use would 
have very few bugs [10]. Since there are infinite possibilities for 
input suite, testers tend to use the “best” sample test to “adequately” 
test the system, where “best” and “adequately” is based on the 
subjective judgement of the tester [10]. 
While the advent of automated systems in automobiles has led to an 
increasing focus on incorporating functional safety in the design 
process, the current version of the standard fails to provide guidance 
on systems with high automation. The industry, acknowledging this 
gap has attempted to address it with the upcoming SOTIF (Safety Of 
The Intended Functionality) publically accepted specification [31]. 
This paper captures the essence of the gap in knowledge of testing for 
ADAS and AD systems and proposes a means to fill this gap. 
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Methodology 
In order to understand the testing approach being undertaken by the 
automotive industry towards ADAS and AD systems to uncover the 
“unknown unknown”, “unknown known” and “known unknown” 
scenarios, the authors conducted a semi-structured interview study 
involving verification and validation experts in the automotive 
domain. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to understand the 
existing knowledge base for test scenario generation process in the 
automotive industry and their understanding and expectations from a 
good/ideal test scenario. Semi-structured interviews were adopted as 
they provide the flexibility to the interviewee to provide wider 
information and thus richer data, by enabling the formation of a 
understanding between the interviewer and the interviewee due to 
face to face contact [32]. Additionally, they allow the flexibility to 
examine topics in different degrees of depth (as per interviewees’ 
interest and background) [33]. The interviews were transcribed and 
the text was sanitized to remove any proprietary mentions. A coding 
analysis was performed on the sanitized text and themes and 
categories were identified from the various interview answers. 
Coding analysis groups participant responses which are similar to 
give a broader understanding of responses. 
In order to prevent any bias, the interviewees were allowed to talk 
freely while answering the questions and were not prompted for any 
answers. Participant interviews were transcribed into text and were 
later coded to perform thematic analysis. Key themes were identified 
in both parts of the interview. 
Ethical approval for the study was secured from the University of 
Warwick’s Biomedical & Scientific Research Ethics Committee 
(BSREC). All interview transcripts were anonymized and stored in a 
secure location and University of Warwick’s data handling 
procedures were followed. 
Participants 
Eighteen industry experts, each participant having over 10 years’ of 
experience in the field of testing and development of systems in the 
automotive industry were recruited for this study. Participants were 
selected from a diverse demography cutting across the automotive 
supply chain. Nine participants represented OEMs (Original 
Equipment Manufacturers), eight participants represented Tier 1/2 
suppliers and the remaining participant represented academic 
/research organizations /start-ups working in the area of automated 
driving. To ensure independence of the interviewees, participants 
were recruited from different countries including the UK, Germany, 
India, Sweden, Japan and USA. The interviews lasted between 28.63 
minutes and 103.15 minutes (average interview length: 48.25 
minutes). Interviewees were also assured that any of the responses 
will not be identifiable to them as the transcripts would be 
anonymized before they were analysed. 
Interview questions design 
The interview was structured with six guiding questions, which were 
divided into two themes: 1) test methods (three questions) 2) test 
scenarios (three questions). Each guiding question had a set of 
follow-up questions, which were asked depending on the content of 
the answers. The set of follow-up (prompting) questions are 
described in Table 1. The follow-up questions were used to aid 
participants thought process and were designed to be minimally 
prescriptive to avoid biasing the answers. The guiding questions were 
formulated by the existing gaps in the literature. The six guiding 
questions were the following: 
Test Methods 
1. What test methods do you use for testing of automotive 
systems? 
2. What are the challenges for each test method that you have 
faced? 
3. What metric do you use to measure sign-off criteria for 
testing automated systems? 
Test Scenarios 
4. How do you ensure robust testing of automated automotive 
systems in various driving conditions? 
5. How do you develop test scenarios for testing automated 
systems? 
6. What criteria do you think make a good quality test 
scenario? 





Reason for selecting a test method? What tools do you use 
as a part of your test setup? 
2 What is your biggest challenge? 
3 
How was the metric developed? Is it a standard metric? 
(Company internal or industry standard) 
4 
What test scenarios do you use while doing real world / 
virtual testing? 
5 
What aspects are critical while developing a test scenario 
for autonomous system? 
6 




As this study employed a semi-structured interview format, the 
analysis of the data was mostly qualitative. In order to structure the 
data analysis and identify trends in the collected data, a coding 
strategy was used. A code “is a word or short phrase that 
symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing , and/or 
evocative attribute to a portion of language-based or visual data” 
[34]. By reading through the transcribed interview text, codes were 
assigned to the text which enabled conversion of the interview text 
into an easy to understand tabulated format. An example of a code 
and corresponding text is discussed here. One of the responses to the 
question on the biggest challenge in testing faced by the interviewees 
was, “it is difficult to create the specification to verify against and 
because of the lack of specification, it is difficult to put a criteria for 
completeness of testing”. The corresponding code assigned to the text 
was “how to ensure completeness of requirements” and “how to 
judge test completeness”. However, it is evident that such a coding 
process is subjective due to the understanding and biases of the coder. 
In order to overcome this, a two stage coding process was followed 
which was reviewed by an independent expert. 
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First cycle coding 
The first coding cycle involved reading through the interview 
transcripts to assign codes. As the data in a semi-structured interview 
transcripts can be varied, different methods of coding such as 
structural coding, descriptive coding, process and in-vivo coding, 
were used [34]. 
Second cycle coding and category identification 
Since different coding methods were used in the first coding cycle, 
some of the codes were similar or split. In order to synthesize the first 
cycle codes to develop a more cohesive understanding, axial coding 
was used in the second phase which led to the creation of categories 
for the first cycle codes. Table 2 illustrates the coding process for the 
answers received to question 5. 
Table 2. Development of codes for question 5 
Participant answers 1st cycle codes 2nd cycle codes 
“what kind of environmental 
















“try to define a test to see the 




“understand situation in which 





“fidelity of test scenario comes 
down to the FMEA. Because out 
of the FMEA there is possibility 






“we would engineer faults into 
the system…. Blocking the radar. 
Put radar absorbent material 
(RAM) for the radar.” 
Create faults, 
block sensors 
“it is currently done via FMEA, 










“have a catalogue of tests” Test library 
“systematic way (of) what kind of 
influencer I have into the 






“you can think about you have a 
matrix…then we look at what 





While it was found that tools (software platforms) for test execution 
were not an issue for most organizations, the infrastructure 
requirement for test platforms (hardware-in-the-loop setup and 
instrumented test vehicles for real-world testing) had exponentially 
increased with ADAS and AD systems as compared to traditional 
automotive systems. In addition, the large amount of data handling 
required for sensors used in the ADAS and AD systems was another 
challenge. 
In response to the first question on test methods used for testing, the 
participant responses could be grouped in two themes. One group of 
participants commented that they follow the software development V 
cycle and implemented model-based design tools using simulation in 
a major part of their development process. On the contrary the other 
group was of the opinion that simulation is of limited use for ADASs 
and AD systems as it is “almost impossible” to model sensors, 
especially RADAR and LiDAR sensors and they mostly depended on 
real world testing. 
More importantly, the input to the test execution platform (test case 
vectors) was a common concern acknowledged by all participants. 
When asked about the biggest challenge faced by the participants 
while performing testing, two specific themes emerged. While the 
OEMs credited “test case generation and definition of pass/fail 
criteria” as their biggest challenge; tier 1/2 suppliers credited 
“quality of requirements (including completeness and consistency)” 
as their biggest challenge. This difference can be credited to the 
culture in the automotive supply chain where the suppliers develop 
individual systems and the responsibility for integration of these 
systems lies with the OEMs. However, both the groups failed to 
mention any solutions to the challenges faced by them during the 
testing phase; the ability to identify and define the “known unknown” 
and the “unknown unknown” scenario space. 
When asked about the parameters and criteria for good test scenarios, 
there seem to be an agreement on the ability to test “known 
unknown” and “unknown unknown” situations, as a key feature of a 
good test scenario. However, a deeper analysis of the responses 
revealed two distinct themes on ways to achieve “good” test 
scenarios. Firstly, creating “good” scenarios from requirements is 
dependent on the skill and experience of the test specifiers. Secondly, 
“good” scenarios should be able to test safety goals and ways in 
which the system may fail or reach system limits. This is generally 
not covered by system requirements. Moreover, the need for a 
systematic method of identifying the system limits or failure 
scenarios was highlighted by the participants. Most experts 
mentioned that Requirements Based Testing (RBT) is insufficient as 
there is a challenge in ensuring completeness of requirements. RBT 
captures the typical scenarios as suggested by the requirements and 
represents the most common real world scenarios. Such testing 
ensures that the most common bugs are identified [10].  
While approaches to improve requirement based testing have been 
discussed in literature [35,36], discussion on the ability to increase 
the “known known” by identifying the unknown space is limited. 
One of the reasons mentioned by experts about RBT was that it is 
impractical to have a requirements document capturing the multitude 
of scenarios an automated driving system might encounter, rendering 
the classical V-cycle for software development obsolete. 
In the testing process, it is important to establish when to stop testing 
and sign-off the system-under-test. When the participants were asked 
about a metric used to measure the sign-off criteria, to our surprise, 
the answers demonstrated the lack of any standard metric in place. 
Unfortunately, the sign-off point was dependent on the budget 
allocated and SOP time. However, all participants acknowledged that 
this wasn’t the ideal situation and needs to change for ADASs and 
ADS systems. However, some participants did provide some insight 
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into an ideal situation and using false positive and false negative rates 
as metric for sign-off. 
When asked about how participants ensured that the ADASs and AD 
systems were tested robustly, they mentioned using a test catalogue 
which was developed from experience. However, all participants 
agreed that for ADAS and AD systems, more real world testing is 
needed due to challenges in simulation environment. On the time 
split between real-world and virtual testing, one of the participants 
commented: “95% is real world testing and 5% is simulation. But for 
me it should 50-50.  For the moment the robust model of the 
simulation is stopping (this to happen)”.  
Discussion 
One of the challenges of identifying “black swan” scenarios is their 
lack of correlation with time [23]. Based on the analysis of the 
interviews, to increase the area covered by the “known knowns” in 
the test scenario space, the authors propose a two-pronged approach 
to testing of ADASs and AD systems to create test scenarios and test 
cases (Figure 5). The first branch concerns using traditional RBT 
approach, while the second branch uses a Hazard Based Testing 
(HBT) approach for creating test scenarios. Traditional RBT method 
covers only a fraction of the possible test scenario space for the 
systems (Figure 5). The addition of the second testing branch (HBT) 
improves the coverage of the test scenario space by increasing the 
“known known” scenario space. However, it does not guarantee full 
coverage of the test space (Figure 5). While RBT checks the working 
of the system as per expectations (defined requirements), HBT 
explores how the system may fail by identifying possible failure 
scenarios.  
HBT draws its inspiration from the world of security analysis. In 
security analysis, the use of misuse cases has been suggested as a 
way of testing for security concerns [37]. Misuse cases can “help 
document negative scenarios” [37]. The key to the success of HBT is 
to have a structured, robust and well-documented method of 
identifying hazards. This was also highlighted in the themes obtained 
from the analysis of the interview transcripts. The two themes were: 
“failure or hazard scenarios” and “systematic method (objective) to 
obtain them”. On being asked about how to develop test scenarios, 
one of the participants commented: “try to define a test to see the 
degradation of the performance”, while another participant 
mentioned: “what kind of environmental influences could lead to an 
ill function”. 
In order to identify hazards, various methods like HAZOP , FMEA 
[38], Event Tree Analysis, JANUS [39], Accimaps [40], HFACS 
[41–43], Fault-tree analysis [44,45], bow-tie analysis [46], System 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) / Systems Theoretic Accident 
Model & Processes (STAMP) [47–49] etc. have been used in the 
industry and research community. Some of these methods were 
developed for simple systems and fall short in analysing modern 
ADAS and AD systems which have multiple interactions between 
system, human operator and the software [50]. In case of an Adaptive 
Cruise Control (ACC) system, rather than testing the functional 
requirements, more emphasis needs to be laid on identifying the 
hazards associated with the usage of an ACC system. An analysis of 
the ACC system using any of the earlier said methods to identify 
hazards would lead to one of the potential hazards as “unintended 
braking”.  
 
Figure 5. Proposed testing approach for test-scenario generation 
Some of the hazard identification methods developed specifically for 
ADAS and AD system (e.g. HFACS, JANUS, STPA) further analyse 
the system interactions to identify that one of the potential causes of 
an “unintended braking (hazard)” could be the “vehicle maneuvering 
through a steep bend” causing the radar system to believe that there is 
an obstacle in front. Therefore an HBT approach would identify such 
situations which would have been missed in a traditional RBT 
approach. 
In order to identify the safety goals and the hazards, a Hazard 
Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) process needs to be 
conducted. The automotive HARA has its own issues like subjective 
variation due to skill and experience of the testers and completeness 
of the HARA, some of these issues have been answered in the 
literature [17]. Once the systems have been tested, their capability 
and safe performance can be correctly established and can form part 
of the knowledge to be imparted to the drivers, in real time or before 
they start their usage, establishing their “informed safety” level to 
improve trust in ADASs and AD systems [51]. However, in order to 
create the “informed safety” level, a more systematic and structured 
process needs to be adopted to testing. As one of the interviewees 
mentioned, “Testing is a science”. 
In this study, the authors had a limited sample size for the interview 
pool due to resource constraints. While a large number of 
practitioners are involved in the field of verification and validation, it 
would be a major challenge to interview a representative sample size. 
However, due to the expertise of the interviewees, the authors believe 
that the current findings provide an important insight in the future 
direction for testing of automated automotive systems, which will be 
an essential component of the system development process. 
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Conclusion 
The lack of a scientific approach to testing has led to the inability of 
the industry to tackle the challenges offered by ADAS and AD 
systems in terms of testing. The authors interviewed 18 automotive 
experts, each with over 10 years’ of experience in testing and 
development of automotive systems. “Creating test scenarios” and 
“ensuring completeness of requirements” were highlighted as the 
main challenges for testing of ADAS and AD systems. However, 
none of the experts could provide a solution to any of the two 
challenges. 
Moreover, the experts suggested that a “good” test scenario is one 
that tests how the system fails or reaches its limits, in addition to 
having a structured approach to define the test scenario. Requirement 
based testing tends to elude capturing this test space, and thus 
according to the experts is not enough when it comes to testing 
ADASs and AD systems.   
Based on a detailed analysis of the interview transcripts, the authors 
have proposed a new approach for testing to increase the coverage of 
the test scenario space. This has been achieved by reducing the 
occurrence of “Black Swan” scenarios (i.e., unknown unknowns) and 
“known unknowns”, by increasing the “known knowns” of the 
system. The proposed method comprises of a two-pronged approach 
to identifying test scenarios. The first branch comprises of the 
traditional requirement based testing (RBT) method, while the second 
branch comprises of a hazard based testing (HBT) approach. The 
latter requires the identification of hazards for a system. The “known 
unknowns”, “unknown knowns” and “unknown unknowns” get 
uncovered in the Hazard Based Testing branch. Safety goals, which 
give rise to hazards, are identified by conducting a Hazard Analysis 
and Risk Assessment (HARA) process. The proposed approach not 
only generates test scenarios for testing how the system works, but 
also how the system may fail, thus increasing the test scenario space.  
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